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THE LEGALITY OF DISSEMINATION OF
MARKET DATA BY TRADE ASSOCIATIONS:
WHAT DOES CONTAINER HOLD?
James M. Kefauver-
Trade associations for many years have operated services, either
directly or through arrangements with third parties, for the collection
and dissemination of statistics relating to particular industries. Such
services typically require each member or subscriber to report informa-
tion pertaining to certain phases of his own operation, such as cost of
raw materials, production, inventory, sales, and prices. This informa-
tion is then compiled and disseminated, usually in composite form, to
other members or subscribers. Until January 1969, when the Supreme
Court rendered its decision in United States v. Container Corporation
of America,' the permissible bounds of statistical reporting programs
under the federal antitrust laws were relatively clearcut. Container has
now made them considerably less clear.
I
THE LAW PRIOR TO Container
Participation by competitors in statistical reporting was established
as legal under section 1 of the Sherman Act2 in Maple Flooring Manu-
facturers Association v. United States3 and Cement Manufacturers Pro-
tective Association v. United States.4 In Maple Flooring the defendant
trade association, composed of twenty-two producers of flooring, oper-
ated a system under which members reported weekly on individual
sales, specifying dates, quantity, grade, kind of wood, prices received,
freight rates, and commissions paid. Members also submitted monthly
reports showing production and new orders of various types of flooring.
All figures submitted referred only to past transactions. The association
compiled the data and disseminated composite figures. Holding that the
t Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1962, American University; LL.B.
1965, University of Michigan.
1 893 U.S. 333 (1969).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). Section 1 provides in pertinent part, "Every contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
3 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
4 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
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government had neither alleged nor proved that there was any agree-
ment among the defendants which affected production or fixed prices,
the Supreme Court noted:
It was not the purpose or the intent of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law to inhibit the intelligent conduct of business operations ....
Persons who unite in gathering and disseminating information in
trade journals and statistical reports on industry; who gather and
publish statistics as to the amount of production of commodities in
interstate commerce, and who report market prices, are not en-
gaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade merely because
the ultimate result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices or limit
production through a better understanding of economic laws and
a more general ability to conform to them, for the simple reason
that the Sherman Law neither repeals economic laws nor prohibits
the gathering and dissemination of information.5
The Court emphasized that "each case arising under the Sherman
Act must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed by the rec-
ord,"6 and distinguished7 three of its earlier decisions which the govern-
ment had primarily relied upon." The unlawfulness of the combina-
tions in those cases, it said,
5 268 U.S. at 583-84 (emphasis added).
6 Id. at 579.
7 Id. at 584-85.
8 In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 284 U.S. 600 (1914),
the members of several associations of retail lumber dealers had agreed to report to the
association, among other things, the names of wholesale dealers who sold members'
products directly to consumers. The names of the offending wholesalers were placed on a
"blacklist" which was circulated among the members of the association. It was held that,
although no agreement to refrain from dealing with the listed wholesalers had been
shown, a conspiracy to accomplish such a restraint could be "readily inferred" as a
"natural consequence" of the circulation list. Id. at 612. The Court noted that the
record showed that the trade of the listed wholesalers actually had been impeded and that
"the natural flow of commerce [had been] interfered with as a direct result of the circula-
tion of the official reports in the manner stated." Id. at 614.
In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 US. 377 (1921), the members
of an association of hardwood producers, under a so-called "Open Competition Plan,"
made daily reports to the association of their sales and shipments, giving full details as to
prices, quantities, and purchasers. Price lists and production reports were submitted
monthly. Estimates as to certain future activities were also elicited. The association dis-
seminated on a weekly basis the sales data, including the names of purchasers and the
prices charged them, and on a monthly basis production and price list information.
Monthly meetings were held at which the written reports were supplemented by further
exchanges of information and discussions. The Court held that although no specific agree-
ment to restrict trade or fix prices was proved, "the fundamental purpose of the 'Plan' was
to procure 'harmonious' individual action among a large number of naturally competing
dealers with respect to the volume of production and prices," and that the restraints of
business honor achieved conformity to the "tacit understanding that all were to act
together under the subtle direction of a single interpreter [the association's manager of
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arose not from the fact that the defendants had effected a combina-
tion to gather and disseminate information, but from the fact that
the court inferred from the peculiar circumstances of each case that
concerted action had resulted, or would necessarily result, in tend-
ing arbitrarily to lessen production or increase prices.9
Although noting that the "[e]xchange of price quotations of market
commodities tends to produce uniformity of prices in the markets of
the world,"' 0 the Court in Maple Flooring could find no basis in the
record for concluding that defendants' concerted action would neces-
sarily result, or had in fact resulted, in an unlawful restraint of trade.
The Court specifically held:
We decide only that trade associations or combinations of per-
sons or corporations which openly and fairly gather and dissemi-
nate information as to the cost of their product, the volume of
production, the actual price which the product has brought in past
transactions, stocks of merchandise on hand, approximate cost of
transportation from the principal point of shipment to the points
of consumption, as did these defendants, and who, as they did, meet
and discuss such information and statistics without however reach-
ing or attempting to reach any agreement or any concerted action
with respect to prices or production or restraining competition, do
not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of commerce. 11
In Cement Manufacturers, which was decided the same day as
Maple Flooring, the defendants were members of a trade association
which had engaged in gathering and disseminating cost and price sta-
statistics] of their common purposes." Id. at 411. As to the effect of the plan, the Court
concluded that the united action of the members had contributed greatly to the unprece-
dented price increases experienced for the grades of hardwood in most general use in the
year 1919. Id. at 409.
United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923), struck down a "sub-
scription agreement" under which 12 linseed oil producers had agreed to furnish price
schedules to an information bureau and to report immediately all their price quotations
which deviated from these schedules, including the names of prospective buyers to whom
lower prices had been quoted. Sales information, including quantity and terms, was
reported daily. The information received by the bureau was made available to members
in the form of statistical reports relating to specific transactions. Monthly meetings of the
subscribers were held to discuss industry matters. The Court held that the agreement took
away defendants' freedom of action by requiring each to reveal "all the intimate details
of its affairs," that such action had a "necessary tendency" to destroy competition, and
that the "manifest purpose was to defeat the Sherman Act." Id. 389-90. Although noting
that it was not called upon to say when or how far competitors may go in revealing to
each other the details of their affairs, the Court observed that "the ordinary practice of
reporting statistics to collectors stops far short of the practice which defendants adopted."
Id. at 390.
9 268 U.S. at 585.
10 Id. at 582.
11 Id. at 586.
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tistics generally, and in addition, in gathering and disseminating de-
tailed information pertaining to "specific job" contracts,12 including
price, quantity, and name of purchasers. The Court relied on the ra-
tionale of Maple Flooring and emphasized the freedom of the members
to use the information as they saw fit:
[T]his record wholly fails to establish, either directly or by infer-
ence, any concerted action other than that involved in the gather-
ing and dissemination of pertinent information with respect to the
sale and distribution of cement to which we have referred; and it
fails to show any effect on price and production except such as
would naturally flow from the dissemination of that information in
the trade and its natural influence on individual action.13
Significantly, the Court stated, "[S]uch activities are not in themselves
unlawful restraints upon commerce and are not prohibited by the Sher-
man Act." 14
As to the practice of members' providing each other with informa-
tion about specific job contracts, the Court said such practices were
justified to protect a member's legal rights from the fraudulent con-
tractor who in a rising market might attempt violation of the specific
job contract by ordering more cement than needed for a particular job.
In this regard the Court observed that the government did not assert
that any understanding existed among members concerning their use
of this information and that the members were free to act or not to
act upon it.15
The proposition that trade associations may collect and dissemi-
nate market information not connected with any agreement to restrain
trade was bolstered in Sugar Institute v. United States.16 In that case
the Supreme Court stated that "while the collection and dissemination
of trade statistics are in themselves permissible and may be a useful
adjunct of fair commerce, a combination to gather and supply infor-
mation as a part of a plan to impose unwarrantable restrictions, as, for
example, to curtail production and raise prices, has been condemned."'
12 A "specific job" contract was, in effect, an option enabling contractors to purchase
cement for a particular job at a set price which could be reduced if the market declined.
The supplier, however, was bound to the price even in a rising market. Experience had
shown that contractors often abused such contracts by obtaining options from several
producers and securing deliveries from each of them, thus receiving at low prices excess
cement which could be used on jobs not covered by the contract. 268 U.S. at 594-96.
13 Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
14 Id.
15 Id. at 608.
16 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
17 Id. at 599-600.
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Sugar Institute added the notion that, depending upon marketing prac-
tices in a particular industry, certain information if made available
to producers must also be made available to purchasers. 18 On the other
hand, the Court seemed to approve, again depending upon the opera-
tions in the market involved, the dissemination of information relating
to current and future prices, 19 even though the information programs
upheld in Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers had dealt only
with past transactions.
Thus the law prior to Container with respect to the gathering and
dissemination of industry data may be summarized as follows: price
and other industry data might be gathered and disseminated by com-
petitors through a trade association or otherwise without violating
section 1 of the Sherman Act if the program had no purpose or effect
of fixing prices, controlling production, or otherwise restraining trade.
The facts of the cases discussed above indicated that information pro-
grams were more likely to pass antitrust muster if they dealt only with
past transactions, did not identify individual parties or transactions,
were available to all competitors, and did not involve meetings, dis-
cussions, or comments by any party on the information disseminated.
Such programs were deemed permissible under section 1 even though
their ultimate result might have been "to stabilize prices or limit pro-
duction through a better understanding of economic laws," 20 and even
though it was recognized that effects on price and production "would
naturally flow from the dissemination of that information in the
trade. '21 At no time had the Supreme Court branded such programs
as unlawful per se under section 1.22
II
Tim IMPLICATIONS OF Container
In Container the Supreme Court by a six to three majority held
that a reciprocal arrangement among eighteen manufacturers of cor-
18 Id. at 604-05.
19 Id. at 603-04.
20 Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 US. 563, 584 (1925).
21 Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 606 (1925).
22 In his dissent in Container, Mr. Justice Marshall observed that the Court in the
past had refused to apply a per se rule to exchanges of price and market information.
593 U.S. at 341. See Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 463 (lst Cir. 1949), where it
was stated that neither American Column r Lumber Co. nor American Linseed Oil Co.
suggested that it was unlawful per se for competitors to agree to an exchange of trade data
through reports to a central agency.
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rugated containers violated section 1 of the Sherman Act because it
had the effect of stabilizing prices. The unlawful combination con-
sisted of defendants' reciprocally providing each other, upon request,
the most recent prices charged or quoted to a specific customer. The
price quoted was the current price which a prospective purchaser would
have to pay the manufacturer. Price exchanges occurred on an infre-
quent and irregular basis, and often the data exchanged were available
from the records of the manufacturers or from the customers them-
selves. The Court concluded that this practice, characterized as a "some-
what casual" agreement,23 satisfied the combination or conspiracy ele-
ment of a section 1 violation.24
Approximately ninety percent of the shipments of corrugated con-
tainers from the southeastern United States were attributable to defen-
dant manufacturers. Entry into the market was easy, requiring an in-
vestment of $50,000 to $75,000. Indeed, even though capacity exceeded
demand during the period covered by the complaint, the industry had
expanded during the same period from thirty manufacturers with forty-
nine plants to fifty-one manufacturers with ninety-eight plants.25 The
Court further noted that although the containers varied as to dimen-
sion, weight, and color, they were substantially identical no matter who
produced them. Demand was inelastic. Sales were based upon price
competition, and when it was known that a competitor was charging
a particular price, a defendant would normally quote the same or a
lower price.26
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated initially that
this case was "unlike any other price decisions we have rendered. ' 27
Douglas observed that it involved an exchange of price information
but no agreement to adhere to a price schedule28 as in Sugar Institute
and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.29 Unlike the exchange of
information in Maple Flooring, actual sales to specific customers were
identified. Although Cement Manufacturers had involved exchange of
information as to prices charged specific customers, that case was dis-
tinguished. The information there disseminated was held to be neces-
sary to protect the cement manufacturers from fraudulent inducement
to deliver excess cement pursuant to specific job contracts. 80
23 393 U.S. at 337.
24 Id. For a discussion of the Court's finding on this point, see Note, The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, 83 HAav. L. REv. 60, 227-35 (1969).
25 393 U.S. at 336.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 334.
28 Id.
29 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
30 393 U.S. at 335; see note 12 supra.
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Douglas said that the result of the reciprocal exchange of infor-
mation in Container was to stabilize prices, although at a downward
level.31 Continuation of some price competition, however, was not fatal
to the Government's case, since interference with the setting of prices
by free market forces is unlawful per se.32 In virtually the same breath,
however, the Court said that exchanges of price information in some
markets may have no effect on a truly competitive price. The Con-
tainer opinion characterized as "irresistible" the inference that the ex-
changes of price information in question had "had an anticompeti-
tive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of price competition." 3
Mr. Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, stated that he did "not
understand the Court's opinion to hold that the exchange of specific
information among sellers as to prices charged to individual customers,
pursuant to mutual arrangement, is a per se violation of the Sherman
Act."3 4 He noted that a "theoretical probability" of a practice falling
within the range of condemnation of the Court's prior decisions was
not enough to establish an unreasonable restraint of trade unless the
mere exchange of current price information was to be regarded as so
akin to price fixing as to deserve a per se classification. 35 Fortas declined
to take this step. He did, however, conclude that there was sufficient
although not overwhelming evidence in the special circumstances of
the case to support a finding of an actual anticompetitive effect.3 6
In a lengthy dissent concurred in by Justices Harlan and Stewart,
Mr. Justice Marshall disagreed with the majority's finding that the
record disclosed a purpose or actual effect of restricting price compe-
tition. The dissenters were especially critical of the Government's ar-
gument that despite overcapacity new companies had entered the mar-
ket during the period covered by the complaint because they must
necessarily have been attracted by the high profits which resulted from
stabilization of prices at an unduly high level.3 7 The minority refused
to assume that the downward trend in prices would have been accel-
erated had the competitors been less informed of each other's prices.
Reduced to simple terms, the dissenters' view was that the Government
had presented a convincing argument in theoretical terms, but the
evidence did not square with the theory. Citing Maple Flooring, Mar-
shall stressed that the defendants were free to use the information as
31 393 U.S. at 336.
32 Id. at 337, citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
33 Id. at 37.
34 Id. at 338-89.
35 Id. at 339.
80 Id.
37 Id. at 345.
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they pleased and that the evidence established they had done so in
reaching individual pricing decisions.3
Trade associations, business concerns, and the antitrust bar are
equally apprehensive about the ultimate thrust of Container. Perhaps
the most difficult problem is whether the majority's conclusion rests
upon a finding of actual or theoretical anticompetitive effect. Although
at one point the Court states flatly that "[t]he result of this reciprocal
exchange of prices was to stabilize prices,"3 9 the bulk of its analysis is
theoretical, focusing on "tendencies" to be found and "inferences" to
be drawn in light of market structure and conditions.40
If the majority's decision is considered to be bottomed wholly on
economic theory, then a new per se rule has been adopted: the ex-
change of current price information as to specific customers and trans-
actions violates section 1 when conducted in an oligopolistic market.41
The majority view raised the specter of per se illegality by invoking the
broad language of Socony-Vacuum, a case decided subsequent to the
information exchange cases preceding Container.42 Taking this theo-
retical view of Container, not only a new rule, but an entirely new
type of per se rule emerges-the Container rule would not ban a spe-
cific type of concerted action in all cases, but would do so only in cer-
tain markets. The Court could not have stated it more succinctly:
"Price information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on
a truly competitive price."43
Obviously a per se rule of this sort places a burden on business
concerns and associations to determine whether a given market can
tolerate any sort of information exchanges among competitors without
risking a finding of a tendency towards price stabilization. Sophisticated
analyses of the structure and conditions of the market would have to
be made. If the conclusion that a particular market could tolerate data
exchanges should ultimately fail judicial scrutiny (in other words, if
defendant's economic analysis is less persuasive than plaintiff's), the
Container case under this interpretation would serve to brand the ex-
38 Id. at 347.
39 Id. at 336.
40 Id. at 337.
41 In oral argument before the Supreme Court, Assistant Attorney General Edwin M.
Zimmerman, in response to Justice Fortas's question whether the Government was seeking
a per se rule, replied, "In an industry dominated by a small number of sellers ... the
exchange of current price with respect to particular customers necessarily inhibits price
competition." When asked, "Without proof of effect?," he replied, "Yes." BNA ANTITRUSr
& TRADE REG. REP., No. 384, Nov. 19, 1968, at A-17.
42 See notes 2-22 and accompanying text supra.
43 393 U.S. at 337.
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change unlawful per se and thereby to preclude defendant from pre-
senting any justification for the exchanges.
Moreover, the per se rule would be less easily administered by
antitrust enforcement authorities than those rules previously articu-
lated by the Court. One of the purposes of having per se rules in the
first place was to avoid "incredibly complicated and prolonged eco-
nomic investigation[s] into the... industry involved. '44
On the other hand, a reasonable reading of the majority opinion,
coupled with Fortas's concurring opinion, is that no new per se rule
was created.45 This view focuses on the Court's finding of an actual
anticompetitive effect. In other words, the rule of reason would be ap-
plied in all price exchange cases, assuming there is no evidence of un-
lawful purpose or of agreement as to how the information was to be
used; a violation of section 1 would be found only upon a showing of
an actual anticompetitive effect in the market.
The view that Container did not promulgate a new per se rule is
buttressed by the Court's failure to overrule expressly or even to nar-
row Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers. These cases were
distinguished on their facts, despite clear statements in both that the
ultimate result of the information exchanges there involved was to
influence individual action in such a way as to stabilize prices or limit
production. It is difficult to square Container's treatment of the sta-
bilization effect with that in Maple Flooring and Cement Manufac-
turers, and the majority in Container must be faulted for its cursory
discussion of those cases. The same is true with respect to the major-
ity's treatment of American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States46
and United States v. American Linseed Oil Co. 47 No real effort was
made to point out any salient features of the exchange programs in
question there as was done in distinguishing Maple Flooring and Ce-
ment Manufacturers. Instead the majority merely observed that the
agreement in Container was "analogous," citing in a footnote the find-
ing in American Column of a purpose to increase prices and the finding
44 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
45 This apparently is the view of the authors of the American Bar Association's up-
dating of the Report of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust
Laws: "The [Container] decision does not hold all exchange of price information unlawful
per se, but further restricts the limited circumstances under which price data can properly
be shared by competitors." ADA SECTION oF ANTrrusT LAw, ANTrrRUsT DEVELOPMENTS,
1955-1968: A SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAI'S NATIONAL Com-
MrrrEE To STuny THE ANTrRusT LAws 1 (Supp. 1968-1970) (footnote omitted).
46 257 US. 377 (1921); see note 8 supra.
47 262 U.S. 371 (1923); see note 8 supra.
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in American Linseed Oil that the plan had a "necessary tendency" to
suppress competition.48
That the majority opinion did in fact deal, though rather casually,
with the Court's previous decisions in price information exchange cases
seems to indicate the continuation of a case-by-case approach in this
area rather than the introduction of a per se rule. Why then was it
necessary for the majority to inject the per se language from Socony-
Vacuum? The answer probably is that Douglas drew upon the opinion
in Socony-Vacuum to underscore the proposition that stabilizing prices,
even at a downward level, is as much within the prohibition of section 1
as classical price fixing. Moreover, perhaps because of the scant record
in Container, consisting mostly of stipulations, the majority may have
felt compelled to invoke the broadest possible language dealing with
the scope of section 1.
The final judgment entered in Container may provide some insight
into the Government's view of the case's implications. With respect to
sales of corrugated containers shipped from the southeastern United
States, defendants were enjoined for a period of ten years from request-
ing or furnishing to other manufacturers or sellers the most recent
prices charged or quoted to identified customers. With respect to de-
fendants' shipments from outside the southeastern United States, how-
ever, defendants were merely prohibited from requesting or furnishing
such information "for the purpose or with the effect of stabilizing
prices, minimizing price reductions or otherwise restraining competi-
tion in price of corrugated containers." 49 Thus from the terms of the
final judgment it appears that the Court regards the exchange of cur-
rent price information as to identified customers to be pernicious only
when it in fact produces an anticompetitive effect. To prove its case
the Government must show such an effect. Of course it is reasonable to
assume that the Government in future cases would take the position,
based on Container, that in a market in which competitors exchanged
current price data as to identified customers, and in which prices were
stable, the latter condition resulted from the former practice. In such
a case Container might serve to shift the burden of proof to the defen-
dants to show that stable prices were the result of market factors other
than the exchange of price data. Consequently, it may be expected that
in future cases of the Container type the defendants will develop a
much more extensive record on market conditions than was before the
Supreme Court in Container.
48 393 U.S. at 337-38 n.3.
49 1970 TRADE CAs. 73,091, at 88,267.
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A final word about the implications of Container for trade associa-
tions is in order. All but one of the defendants in Container were
members of the Fiber Box Association, which was not named in the
complaint as a defendant or co-conspirator. This association collected
and disseminated statistical data which did not pertain to specific trans-
actions but rather were designed to indicate recent price trends for
corrugated containers. In oral argument before the Supreme Court,
Government counsel pointed out that this was not a case that "seeks
to outlaw the availability of price information. The trade association
is not challenged, price manuals are not challenged.... This is a case
which claims that defendants through a combination have become too
precise and that precision inhibits competition."50 Thus nothing in the
Container opinion itself or in the Government's presentation of its case
could be taken as a frontal attack on the statistical reporting activities
of trade associations.
III
CASES SUBSEQUENT TO Container
Two district court decisions subsequent to Container provide
some indication of how that decision will be applied. In United States
v. FMC Corp.51 the Government alleged that FMC's exchange of price
and other market information in meetings with its competitors in the
chlor-alkali industry violated section 1. More specifically, the Govern-
ment charged that these meetings led to stabilization of the price of
caustic soda, for which demand was relatively inelastic and which was
in long supply during the period covered by the complaint. In 1960
the nine original defendants52 accounted for eighty-eight percent of
the caustic soda capacity of the United States.5 3
Early in its discussion, the court observed that in arguing by
analogy from Container, "it is well to keep in mind the admonition
of the United States Supreme Court in Maple Flooring Manufactur-
ing [sic] Ass'n v. United States ... that 'each case arising under the
Sherman Act must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed by
the record' ... ,,. The court noted that this case did not involve the
50 BNA ANzrr=usr & TRADE REG. REP., No. 884, Nov. 19, 1968, at A-13.
51 806 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
52 Eight chlor-alkali producers named as defendants in the original complaint entered
into consent decrees prior to trial. Id. at 1109.
53 Id. at 1113.
54 Id. at 1142 (citation omitted).
19721
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
relatively routine and systematic exchanges by competitors of statistical
information through the agency of a trade association, as did Maple
Flooring and Cement Manufacturers. Instead, information exchanges
"occurred only when necessary to impart information concerning de-
partures from the established list price of caustic soda or disparities in
quoting freight rates which portended industry-wide repercussions if
not controlled in their impact." 55 The court concluded therefore that
defendants had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act not only by
exchanging information in a manner and with an effect proscribed by
the Supreme Court in Container, but also that
FMC and its competitors did more than exchange information with
one another under an implied agreement to supply information
whenever requested, and use the information obtained to stabilize
the market. The record of this case disclosed instances of direct
assurances, as well as implied assurances and agreements, that
"the disposition of men 'to follow their most intelligent competi-
tors' " would be reinforced by a concert of action, in which all
would willingly participate, to restrain the normal competition
and fluctuations of the market place.56
Apparently FMC added no gloss to Container, for the court found
an agreement violative of section 1 independent of any violation based
on Container. Something should be said, however, of the court's char-
acterization of Container as holding that the defendants used the
information obtained from one another to stabilize the market.57 This
statement implies that the Container defendants exchanged price
information for the purpose of stabilizing prices throughout the
industry. The majority in Container of course found an effect of price
stabilization, but nothing in the opinion indicated that they had
found a purpose on the part of defendants to achieve such an effect.
The final judgment entered in FMC, although prohibiting FMC
from reporting its prices and other data to competitors, contained the
following proviso:
Nothing contained in this Judgment shall be deemed to enjoin
or restrain Defendant from:
Furnishing to any trade association, other organization or
industry group, information in connection with any otherwise law-
ful project, study, analysis, survey, or the like; provided that such
information is furnished upon the condition that it be held in
confidence and not be made known or available to any other Person
55 Id. at 1146.
56 Id. at 1152 (footnote omitted).
57 Id. at 1142.
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except as part of a composite containing other similar infor-
mation .... 58
The express permission granted FMG to participate in data exchanges
resulting in the publication of composite figures constitutes at least
tacit recognition by the Government of the legitimacy of such activity.
What the Government apparently was concerned with in both Con-
tainer and FMC was the direct exchange of information so precise
that it would necessarily result in price stabilization. The Government
focused on this point in oral argument in Container and the court in
FMC noted both that the information there exchanged as to selective
discounts was not a matter of "precise common knowledge immediately
upon [the discount's] occurrence," and that chlor-alkali producers
"apparently did not consider indirect methods of communication pre-
cise enough to insure that they all would know the exact nature of the
transactions."59
The second case in which Container was discussed in some depth
is Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co.60 In this private treble
damages action the plaintiffs, who were customers of the defendant
gypsum wallboard manufacturers, charged that defendants had violated
the Sherman Act by (1) verifying for each other, pursuant to a mutual
understanding, the prices which they reportedly had offered or charged
to particular customers, and (2) withdrawing by concerted action cer-
tain exceptions to their price lists and terms of sale. With respect to
the first charge, plaintiffs contended that the case was controlled by
Container.
Defendants' tacit understanding whereby they mutually agreed to
withdraw certain price concessions was found by the district court to
be a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act; but no violation was
found in defendants' price verification activities. Although Judge
Zirpoli noted that the gypsum wallboard market possessed many of the
same characteristics as the corrugated container market-oligopolistic
in structure, homogeneous product, excess capacity, inelastic demand,
and sales turning mostly on price-he ruled that the case fell within
what he called the" 'exception of Container.' ,,s Judge Zirpoli said that
"by recognizing and distinguishing Cement Manufacturers, Container
excepts a case in which sellers exchange price information relating to
58 United States v. FMC Corp., 317 F. Supp. 443, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (emphasis in
original).
59 306 F. Supp. at 1144.
60 526 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
61 Id. at 312.
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specific customers where there is present a 'controlling circumstance.' "62
The controlling circumstance in Cement Manufacturers was the cement
producers' desire to protect themselves against fraudulent inducements
to deliver excess cement under "specific job" contracts 83 In Wall
Products, the court found two controlling circumstances: (1) defen-
dants' need to avoid the consequences of fraudulent misrepresentations
by buyers under the "job price protection" practice of the wallboard
industry (which was similar in effect to the "specific job" contract in
the cement industry), and (2) the need for defendants to obtain
accurate price information to avail themselves of the Robinson-Patman
defense of having met competition in good faith.6
Most of the court's opinion was directed at the latter controlling
circumstance, observing that the Supreme Court in Container had made
no reference whatever to the Robinson-Patman defense. 65 The court
stressed that the record was replete with evidence that the purpose
of the price verification system, operated on the advice of defendants'
respective attorneys, was to achieve compliance with the Robinson-
Patman Act by meeting but not beating competition when selling
below list prices, and that verifications occurred only after a defendant
had exhausted other available means of confirming reported deviations
by competitors from their list prices. Significantly, Judge Zirpoli con-
cluded that the price verification did not violate section 1, even though
he expressly determined that it "had a tendency to stabilize price in
that it retarded any downward spiral in price deviations." 66
In Wall Products the court confronted the problem of striking a
balance between the prohibitions of section 1 of the Sherman Act and
the requirements of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. It may
be that Judge Zirpoli went too far in approving defendants' activities
on Robinson-Patman grounds at the expense of Sherman Act con-
siderations, for there is a serious question whether a seller, in order to
qualify for the good faith meeting of competition defense, must contact
a competitor directly to verify prices reportedly quoted by the latter.
The Wall Products decision also raises ,the question of the scope of
the "exception of Container" it describes. At the core of the Supreme
Court's holding in Container was the finding that the price exchanges
had the effect, either actual or theoretical, of stabilizing prices. It
therefore is doubtful that in its one-sentence treatment of Cement
62 Id. at 312-13.
63 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
64 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
65 326 F. Supp. at 312.
66 Id. at 311 (footnote omitted).
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Manufacturers the majority in Container intended to carve out an
"exception" as such. Even if such an exception was indeed intended,
however, in view of the Court's sensitivity to the tendency of exchanges
of price information to chill the vigor of price competition, it would
appear that the defendants should have to present substantial evidence
of having been systematically victimized by customer fraud and to
show that the exchange of price information was the only practicable
solution to the problem.
CONCLUSION
Container placed a new emphasis on the effect of competitors'
exchange of market information. Although the Supreme Court dis-
tinguished on their facts Maple Flooring and Cement Manufacturers,
cases that subordinated the stabilization effect to the interest of com-
petitors' having full knowledge of the marketplace, the broad teaching
of Container seems to be that if exchanges of price information have
the effect of stabilizing prices or otherwise interfering with the free
play of market forces, they violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. And
a violation may be found even if the exchanges are not shown to have
been part of a larger scheme to manipulate the market, but merely
to have provided businessmen with information used in individual
decision making.
The Court's obvious sensitivity to the possible anticompetitive
effects of exchanges of price information might be taken as heralding a
new per se rule. In my view, the Court in Container did not lay down
a per se rule, even though it did use some indicative language. A read-
ing of Container as a whole seems rather to suggest that the majority,
subjecting the price exchanges to analysis under the rule of reason,
found them in violation of section 1 under the circumstances. Nor
should the per se approach be applied in cases involving exchanges of
price information, for full knowledge of the market, including price
factors, is a legitimate business interest. For a plaintiff to establish
that a collective effort to obtain such information, absent a showing
of unlawful purpose, produced an anticompetitive effect, he should
be required to develop a complete record as to the mechanics of the
exchange and especially as to the structure and conditions in the
particular market. Further, it should not be enough for a plaintiff to
show merely that prices in the industry were stable; he should be
required to show that defendants' exchange of price information con-
tributed appreciably to such stability.
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Trade associations which gather and disseminate market informa-
tion on behalf of their members should study their respective industries
to determine whether such a program is likely to hinder the free play
of market forces and particularly whether the program may affect
prices. In industries likely to be considered concentrated, it might
well be that no exchanges of price information are permissible. In
industries not likely to be considered concentrated, information ex-
change programs should be organized and operated with a view towards
eliminating any possibility of their affecting the overall market. In
this connection, trade associations should consider the following factors
in their efforts to assess the possible effects of a program on the market:
whether the information disseminated pertains only to past prices or
transactions, whether the information reveals, directly or indirectly,
data pertaining to individual competitors and particular transactions,
and whether the information is available to all parties who might need
it to compete effectively. It is advisable that the association employ a
third party to run the program, and that it be run in such a way as to
preclude direct communications or discussions of the information by
the members. In addition, the information disseminated should be
limited to raw statistics; comments or recommendations by the associa-
tion or a third party running the program could be construed as
fostering uniform action.
At the very least, the short term effect of Container should be to
cause trade associations to take a hard look at market information
programs in terms of anticompetitive effects. As to the long term
significance of the case, Mr. Justice Cardozo said it all: "Cases do not
unfold their principles for the asking. They yield up their kernel
slowly and painfully." 67
67 B. CADozo, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PRocEss 29 (1921).
